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Resumo
Alguns artigos na literatura mostram que os eleitores são conservadores em assuntos fiscais enquanto 
outros encontram evidências de preferência por uma expansão fiscal. Nós usamos um modelo Probit tradi-
cional para analisar a preferência dos eleitores municipais brasileiros na eleição de 2000. Nosso principal 
resultado sugere que os eleitores preferem mais gastos. Apresentamos algumas evidências de que esse 
resultado é uma consequência do modelo de federalismo fiscal existente no qual predomina uma restrição 
orçamentária fraca para os municípios (contexto institucional). Adicionalmente, obtivemos evidências de 
que os eleitores com diferentes níveis de escolaridade impõem diferente resultado nos gastos. O efeito 
do gasto é maior nos municípios onde o nível de alfabetização é menor.
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Abstract
Some papers in literature show that voters are fiscal conservatives, while others find evidence of a prefer-
ence for fiscal profligacy. We use a traditional Probit model to analyze the preference of Brazilian municipal 
voters in the 2000 election. The main result suggests that voters prefer greater expenditure. We present 
evidence that this result is a consequence of a fiscal federalism model where there is a soft budget con-
straint for municipalities (institutional context). Moreover, we obtained evidence that voters with different 
levels of schooling impose a different result on expenditure. The effect of expenditure is more marked in 
municipalities with a low level of literacy.   
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1 Introduction
One part of political economy literature indicates that voters are fiscal conservati-
ves: they tend not to reelect incumbents who increase expenditure, create deficits, 
or inflate public debt. However, there are also studies showing that it is possible 
for incumbents to use fiscal instruments to obtain electoral advantage. In trying to 
understand why these differences exist, recent works have explored the institutio-
nal context of these relations. 
Basically, literature on the relationship between fiscal performance and electoral 
results has been applied to a cross-section of countries and also to a single country’s 
local governments. The strength of the former approach is that it provides mean 
results that can be generalized for all countries. Its weakness lies in the fact that it 
is not always possible to control all the institutional and socio-economic differences 
between the sampled countries (Drazen; eslava, 2005). On the other hand, 
studies of local government elections, such as this, have the advantage of dealing 
with a smaller constitutional, legal and electoral variation across federative units, 
thus enabling more accurate results. still, as noted by Brender (2003) and Brender 
and Drazen (2005), the results obtained for a country’s local governments cannot 
be generalized for other countries, as they are dependent upon local institutional 
and socio-economic characteristics that create a framework of incentives and cons-
traints that will drive voter decisions.1
This article analyzes the 2000 elections for mayor in Brazil. It shows that voters 
appear to approve increased spending. nevertheless, from additional investigations 
we carried out we understand that this behavior is not part of a typical political-
budget cycle, in which expenditure increases before elections and a fiscal adjust-
ment occurs at the beginning of the new administration. The Brazilian case appears 
to be a soft budget constraint phenomenon, in which both voters and mayors have 
incentives to increase expenditure during the whole term of office, in an attempt 
to bring in as much money as they can extract from the common pool. In previous 
work, nakaguma (2006) shows that Brazilian governors use fiscal instruments 
to obtain electoral advantage; but, he does not explore the institutional context. 
Moreover, the 2000 municipal election is also important because it was the first 
election when all the mayors who assumed office in 1997 could run for reelection; 
they were not allowed to do so before this.
The Brazilian institutional context has different facets, such as the considerable 
political weight of local interests in national Congress; the heterogeneity of munici-
1 arvate, avelino and Tavares (2009) carried out the same type of investigation for elections for 
governor. 
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palities, which allows a coalition of interests between large and small municipalities, 
which coordinate their efforts to obtain federal funds; excessive fiscal transfers; 
the municipalities’ ability to manipulate transfer rules; and central government’s 
inability to withstand pressures for bailouts and set effective legal constraints on 
sub-national indebtedness. The Brazilian case is also important because there is 
little evidence in Brazilian literature of the importance of the voters’ level of edu-
cation on this process, given that voting is compulsory for adults (between 18 and 
60 years old).  We have evidence that shows that voters with different educational 
levels (low literacy) impose different results on expenditure. In municipalities with 
a low literacy rate, the increase in expenditure in the term appears to have a much 
stronger effect on mayors’ reelection. 
section 2 summarizes the literature that was consulted to help in the development 
of our work. section 3 introduces the institutional characteristics of municipal 
elections in Brazil. section 4 describes the econometric model adopted and the da-
tabase used. section 5 gives the basic econometric results. section 6 analyzes how 
heavy dependence on transfers and the educational level can contribute to modify 
the main results. section 7 provides comments on additional results and section 8 
concludes the paper.
2 The Literature that Sustains our Development
Part of the political economy literature tries to interpret the preference of voters 
by analyzing fiscal results. some empirical works focus on local governments (mu-
nicipalities and states) of a single country, while others compare different coun-
tries. Our intention here is to show some of these works and to emphasize the new 
generation of work that is using the institutional context to justify the differences 
found. In our view, this line of work can lead to a better understanding of the 
behavior of Brazilian local voters.   
Peltzman (1992) wrote the first important work showing that voters punish Us 
governors who increase spending, regardless of whether this increase is based on 
deficit or taxes (“spending is the primary bad” – p. 347). It also shows evidence that 
increased spending on the eve of elections does not fool voters, and that incumbents 
are punished even more severely when spending increases at the end of their terms. 
His explanation for this phenomenon is that the tax system is progressive and voters 
are wealthier than non-voters (the vote is non-compulsory). so, it is the voters who 
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foot the bill. He adds that voters are well informed about fiscal data and use this 
information when casting their ballots.2
Drazen and eslava (op. cit.) argue that well-informed voters are not easily bought by 
increased spending and are averse to higher levels of spending and deficit. Their in-
vestigation concentrates on local governments in Colombia. They further argue that 
political manipulation takes the form of changes in the composition of government 
spending, by keeping total spending and the deficit constant. This is due to the fact 
that voters, albeit rational and forward-looking, lack sufficient information to deter-
mine whether the pre-vote spending composition choices that incumbents make are 
sincere or not; besides, incumbents have more information than voters themselves 
about the preferences of the majority of voters. These quantitative results indicate 
an increased probability of reelection when there is increased investment spending 
and a reduced deficit. Besides, there is no relation between probability of reelection 
and increased current spending. 
By analyzing OeCD countries, alesina et alli (1998) also uphold the argument that 
voters are fiscal conservatives. analyzing government replacement (cabinet dismis-
sals in parliamentary regimes or non-reelection in presidential ones), their results 
offer no evidence that voters punish governments for redu-
cing deficits. In the case of large adjustments, it seems that 
if a government relies mostly on spending cuts – and on cuts 
in government wages, in particular – it is less likely to fall 
(…) there is no evidence that fiscal profligacy is associated 
with longer survival in office. (p. 226 e 229). 
On the other hand, there is some evidence that the incumbent can benefit from 
the electoral cycle by using fiscal instruments. such is the case of the work of 
nakaguma (op. cit.) relating to Brazil and veiga and veiga (2007) to Portugal. 
nakaguma (op. cit.) studies the case of Brazilian state governments and shows that 
the electorate rewards opportunistic cycles in both revenue and expenditure. 3 
veiga and veiga (op. cit.) present other robust evidence of opportunistic fiscal cycles 
when analyzing the case of Portuguese municipalities. They show that increases in 
investment expenditure and changes in the composition of spending in favor of 
highly visible items are associated with a higher percentage of votes for incumbent 
mayors seeking re-election.
2 note that Us state Constitutions limit state indebtedness and that the public debt market 
severely punishes governments that are declared bankrupt. These institutional circumstances 
certainly help voters evaluate incumbents.
3  He does not explore the institutional context to define voter preference. 
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There are authors who argue that the fiscal conservativism of voters depends on the 
institutional context in which the elections occur. The sets of constraints and incen-
tives imposed on governments and voters appear to make a difference. analyzing 
the case of local governments in Israel, Brender (op. cit.) suggests that in the 1989 
and 1993 ballots fiscal performance had no bearing on the probability of reelection 
for mayor, but that the situation had shifted in 1998, when voters rewarded more 
conservative fiscal stances. He argues that this was the result of institutional evolu-
tion, such as: central government-mandated audits, detailed fiscal statements (im-
proving voter information levels), increased circulation of local newspapers, more 
relevant information available to voters; and the imposition of a tighter budget 
constraint (an end to financial rescue operations and an adjustment program, with 
the last rescue operation, carried out in 1997-99, signaling a change in the rules of 
the game). analyzing 1998 data only, Brender (op. cit.) further concludes that voters 
punish mayors who pay higher-than-average wages, as well as those showing feeble 
tax collection efforts. as far as concerns the composition of expenditure, he finds 
a result similar to Drazen and eslava (op. cit.), revealing that voters reward a budget 
that is biased towards capital expenditure. Moreover, he shows that no differences 
in the probability of reelection are linked to the socio-economic level of the local 
community (which differs from the result we obtained for Brazil). 
The institutional idea is reinforced by akhmedov and zhurasvskaya (2004). They 
show that russia, an “immature democratic regime”, has significant and robust 
opportunistic fiscal cycles. They argue that “russian democracy is very young and 
many regions are notorious for governor´ s control over mass media and large fraction 
of uninformed, naïve and myopic electorate (…) poor voters (…) are the primary 
target of the cycle [because they] have the worst possibilities for consumption 
smoothing. (…). Irrespective of the driving force of the cycle – asymmetric infor-
mation or voter inexperience – it indicates the absence of checks and balances on 
politicians common in mature democracies (i.e., separation of powers, free media, 
active nGOs, etc.) that give voters fuller information and longer-term control over 
politicians.” (ibidem, p. 3, 4 and 5)
Finally, Brender and Drazen (op. cit.) analyze a group of countries at different levels 
of development to show that voters in developed countries are fiscal conservatives, 
rewarding reduced deficit both throughout the term and in the pre-vote year. In 
less-developed countries, on the other hand, there is no statistically significant re-
lationship between deficit and reelection; which does not allow us to reject the hy-
pothesis that there is a preference for fiscal expansionism in such countries. When 
countries are divided into new and old democracies, the results show that voters 
in older democracies are fiscal conservatives, but no statistically significant corre-
lation is found for young democracies. This is possibly an indication of a learning 
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process by voters, who, in the course of many administrations and elections, might 
understand the importance of long-term fiscal balance and become less susceptible 
to pre-vote maneuvers on the part of politicians.
3 Municipal Elections in Brazil: Institutional Characteristics
Brazil is a federation with three levels of government: Federal Government (Union), 
26 state governments, 1 Federal District (national capital), and 5,506 municipali-
ties in the year 2000 (by 2007, the number had risen to 5,562). The 1988 Federal 
Constitution guarantees municipalities their status as federation members (not 
subordinated, therefore, to the states or the Union), with local elections every 
four years for two branches (executive and legislative), local tax jurisdiction and 
constitutional entitlement to inter-governmental transfers. 
Brazil provides an appropriate situation for the intended econometric study. Firstly, 
such a large number of municipalities supply a lot of information.4 In addition, 
certain institutional characteristics make the study easier: municipal elections (for 
mayor and councilors) for four-year terms are held on the same day in every muni-
cipality. The timing of the election is therefore exogenous and does not depend on 
incumbent performance, unlike voting systems where elections can be convened 
at any time. The law prohibited reelection for executive positions until 1996 (pre-
sident of the republic, governors and mayors). a constitutional amendment was 
passed in June 19975 allowing an additional term for these positions. 
as a result, every mayor elected in november 1996 was eligible to run for reelec-
tion in november 2000. It is important to point out that mayors already knew that 
they would be able to attempt reelection right from the very beginning of their 
terms, and could therefore design their administration strategies with this in mind.6 
Furthermore, the timing of Brazilian municipal elections is different from that of 
state and federal elections. The latter two are held simultaneously, two years into 
the intervening period between municipal elections. This means that mayors have 
the following choices available to them at the end of their terms: 
1) Give up their political career; 
2) run for councilor (a municipal role of lesser importance); 
4 Brender (2003), for example, relied on little more than 100 observations to analyze the Israeli 
case, while we worked with 2,732 observations.
5 Constitutional amendment no. 16, dated June 5th, 1997.
6 see schlesinger (1966) on vertical or horizontal political career advancement. 
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3) run for reelection;
4) spend two years without a mandate while awaiting the opportunity to run for a 
different position at the state or federal level.
For the purposes of this article, choice #4 will be deemed subordinated to choice 
#3 and, therefore, disregarded. This is because incumbent mayors can run for a 
different office at any time. For a politician who is aiming to advance his or her 
career by attempting state or federal office, the best choice is to run for reelection 
as mayor (choice #3) and, two years later, use their status as mayor (media expo-
sure, administrative accomplishments, public funds) to launch a more ambitious 
candidature with higher stakes involved. spending two years in limbo to then re-
turn to the political scene in pursuit of a higher position is not common practice 
in Brazilian politics.
Choice #2, in turn, is practically equivalent to giving up the political career (choice 
#1), due to the great difference in status between the office of mayor and that of 
councilor. This choice, besides being statistically irrelevant (only 10 cases in a uni-
verse of over five thousand observations), indicates that the individual has a very 
poor chance of reelection and advancement as a politician. 
Therefore, only choices #1 and #3 - whether to run for reelection or not - are re-
levant. Our hypothesis is that politicians wish to be reelected. 
4   The Model and the Data
4.1  The Model
The probability of success when searching for a second term may be modeled as a 
probit binary choice with selection of the type:
 
* 'i i iREEL z= α + η  (1)
 
* *1 0 0 0i i t tREEL if REEL or REEL if REEL= > = ≤
The reeli* variable shows the probability of mayor being reelected, considering all 
control terms contained in vector zi; where i is the observation unit (i.e., the muni-
cipality and its mayor). nevertheless, the value of reel* is not observed. One can 
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only observe whether the mayor is reelected or not. It obliges us to work with the 
binary variable reeli, which indicates whether the mayor was reelected (reeli 
=1) or not (reeli =0). assuming that ηi has a standard normal distribution, with 
mean 0 and variance 1, the probability of the mayor being reelected is given by the 
normal accumulated density function £(.).
Given that Mainwaring (1999) considers parties to be weak, with poor partisan 
discipline (politicians can freely switch parties in the course of their terms, and 
often do), and there are no clear ideological distinctions between them, we do not 
consider the reelection of parties. as there is information available on the perma-
nence of individuals in power, we will work with this more accurate concept.
Despite the countless benefits of working with individuals in a personal voting 
system with weak party discipline,7 a constraint arises: the effects of reelection 
cannot be analyzed in the long run by means of panel analysis. Because the law only 
allows reelection once for each mayor, we were unable to build a panel to observe 
the ballot performance of a given politician over several elections: each politician 
will be present, at most, in two successive elections for mayor, which generates 
a single reelection observation. as a result, we can only perform a cross-section 
analysis, which subjects the results to the political and economic circumstances 
in force at the time of the cross-section observation (“time effect”). We could 
also not isolate the “fixed effect” of municipalities, using a fixed effect panel data 
model. Having only a cross-section database we use a large set of control variables 
to isolate the specific features of municipalities and the personal traits of mayors 
from the analysis.
In order to define the main fiscal variables, we followed the pattern suggested by 
Brender and Drazen (op. cit.), defining fiscal expansion or contraction by comparing 
the average of the variable in the second half of the term with its average during 
the first half. Given that mayors are elected for four-year terms, the average of the 
last two years is compared with the average of the first two. To check results for 
robustness, we used alternative definitions.
The set of control variables comprises the geographical, social and economic fea-
tures of municipalities and the personal features of mayors. The idea is to control 
for the many specific characteristics (for instance, the level of economic and social 
development) that may influence voter behavior and the electoral result. Following 
Brender (op. cit.), Drazen and eslava (op. cit.), Brender and Drazen (op. cit.), and 
veiga and veiga (op. cit.), we control the percentage of votes the mayor obtained in 
his or her former election (Votes96) as a means of controlling for popularity, perso-
7 see Brazil’s classification in Carey and shugart (1995). 
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nal characteristics or “political capital”. Other control variables are the geographic 
area of each municipality (variable Area), number of inhabitants in 2000 (variable 
Population00), population growth in the period between the 1991 and the 2000 
census (variable Population Growth0091), a dummy variable with a value equal to 
1 for municipalities that belong to a metropolitan region and zero otherwise (va-
riable Metropolitan Region), dummy variables (each region has a dummy with a 
value equal to 1 and zero, otherwise) for four Brazilian regions: North, Northeast, 
Midwest, and South; a dummy variable with its value equal to 1 for municipalities 
that are state capitals and zero otherwise (variable State Capital), percentage of the 
population that lives in urban areas of the municipality (variable Urban Population), 
the municipal population as a percentage of the total state population (variable % 
of State Population) and a dummy variable with its value equal to 1 if the 2000 
election is the first election in a recently created municipality and zero otherwise 
(variable New Municipality). 
It is worthwhile explaining the importance of the variable New Municipality. 
Municipalities are able to manipulate fund distribution criteria in such a manner 
as to secure additional resources from the two main sources of transfer revenues. 
This is done by creating new municipalities from the subdivision of existing ones. 
according to IBGe data, 50 percent of the country’s municipalities have fewer than 
10 thousand inhabitants. This is not an exogenous factor arising simply from socio-
economic and geographic conditions. The 1988 Constitution established sharing 
criteria for the Municipal Participation Fund (the main source of federal transfers) 
that are strongly biased in favor of municipalities with up to 10,163 inhabitants. 
as a result, a wave of municipalities was created. larger municipalities began to 
subdivide in an effort to secure additional federal funds. In 1980 Brazil had 3,991 
municipalities. The number rose to 4,974 in 1993 and 5,567 in 2004.8 Countless 
municipalities were created simply to receive transfers without having the mini-
mum traits of local identity, community structure or the potential for fiscal self-
sustainability that might characterize such places as independent towns.
The second largest item of transfers to municipalities also induces municipality 
multiplication, but for different reasons. The transfer of 25% of the states’ vaT 
(ICMS) to municipalities is divided according to the destination principle: transfers 
are made to the municipality where the state-tax was collected. Given that ICMS 
is partly collected at source, the state government generates high revenues from 
this tax in municipalities that are home to large commercial or industrial establish-
ments. as a result, such municipalities are entitled to hefty transfers. This has 
8 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e estatística [Brazilian Institute of Geography and statistics] 
(IBGe). For a detailed analysis of the municipality creation process, see shikida (1998)
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encouraged industrial districts to seek emancipation, thus becoming autonomous 
municipalities in order to internalize such transfers.
Considering that Heckman (1979) argues that the choice of running for reelection 
should not be exogenous but determined by pre-established conditions and that if 
this rule is ignored, individuals with these conditions are compared to individuals 
without them, we decided to control the possibility of selection. Heckman (ibidem) 
developed a methodology for dealing with this. Our target is to adapt this model 
before (equation [1]) by considering that the pre-established condition which indi-
viduals share for running for reelection is their age.  This aspect is even included 
in our controls, where we have included a dummy for individuals over 70 (variable 
elderly), because they are less capable of running for reelection (candidate) than 
younger individuals:
 
* 'i i iCAND x= β + ε  [2]
 
* *1 0 0 0i i t tCAND if CAND or CAND if CAND= > = ≤
The CANDi* variable shows the mayor’s probability of being a candidate in terms 
of the control and explanatory variables, all of them contained in vector xi, where 
i is the observation unit (i.e., the municipality and its mayor). nevertheless, the 
value of CAND* is not observed. We can only observe if the mayor has decided to 
be a candidate or not. It obliges us to work with the binary variable CANDi, which 
indicates whether the mayor was a candidate (CANDi=1) or not (CANDi=0). 
assuming that εi has a standard normal distribution, with mean 0 and variance 1, 
the probability of the mayor being a candidate is given by the normal accumulated 
density function Φ(.).
One can only estimate the reelection equation (i.e., equation [1]) in those cases in 
which the mayor was a candidate (CANDi = 1). In this subset of mayor-candidates, 
it is assumed that ηi and εi have normal bivariate distribution with mean 0 and va-
riance 1, with a correlation ρ among the errors of the two equations: 
 [ηi ,εi] ~ N2 [0,0,1,1,pηε]
It is expected that ρ>0, in other words, the same variables considered in the mo-
del that increase (decrease) candidature probability would also increase (decrease) 
reelection chances. If ρ=0 then there is no selection bias and the reelection and 
candidature equations are independent, making estimation of the selection model 
unnecessary. In this case, it would be possible to estimate only the reelection equa-
tion (i.e., a simple Probit model).
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4.2  Data
In accordance with data from the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral [superior electoral 
Court] (Tse), 43% of the sampled mayors were reelected. Of the 57% that did 
not achieve reelection, 30% ran, and 27% did not. Data on the ballot, fiscal policy, 
socio-economic features and the mayor’s personal characteristics were not always 
available for all municipalities, which reduced our sample. In addition, three mayors 
ran for state or federal-level offices in 1998 and stayed out of the 2000 race; and 
21 mayors died in the course of their first mandate. This left us with 2,732 muni-
cipalities, or 49.6% of the 5,506 municipalities that existed in Brazil in 2000. 
This raises the possibility of sampling bias, given that data unavailability may be 
caused by a specific type of municipality, such as, for example, those in less deve-
loped areas, those with limited administrative capabilities, etc., and those where 
voter preferences also differ from the average. To assess this possibility, Table 1 pro-
vides average figures for some of the municipal characteristics available for all 5,506 
municipalities and compares them with the averages obtained from the sample.
Table 1 – Characteristics of Brazilian Municipalities: universe vs. sample (averages)
Universe Sample
State capital 0.47% 0.51%
North Region 8.2% 3.5%
Northeast Region 32.5% 20.8%
Center-West Region 8.1% 8.7%
South Region 21.0% 30.7%
Southeast Region 30.3% 36.3%
Life expectancy at birth (years) 67.7 69.1
Adult literacy rate (%) 78.2% 81.6%
Gross school attendance rate (%) 78.0% 78.0%
Per capita income (2000 R$) 171 194
Longevity index (IDHM-L) 0.712 0.735
Education index (IDHM-E) 0.781 0.804
Income index (IDHM-R) 0.604 0.631
Municipal Human Development Index (IDH-M) 0.699 0.723
Population, 2000         30,466         32,643 
Percentage of population residing in urban area 59% 60%
source: UnDP.
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note that municipalities in the northern and northeastern regions, the country’s 
poorest and least developed, are under-represented in the sample. On the other 
hand, municipalities in the more developed areas (south and southeast) are 
over-represented. This is reflected in the other statistics: the sample’s Human 
Development Index is higher than that of the universe, as is also the case with 
income, schooling, life expectancy and education indicators. The sample’s average 
population is also a little higher than that of the universe.
The bias in the estimated coefficients, which may be a result of this sampling bias, 
does not invalidate the results discussed here. Quite the opposite; it is an indication 
of robustness, because, as we shall see further on, municipalities in the north and 
northeast, as well as those with lower schooling are those where voters are most 
likely to support expenditure expansionism. Therefore, if we obtain evidence that 
the sampled voters support expenditure increases, the same goes for the whole 
electorate.  appendix I provides a detailed description of the main fiscal variables, 
control variables, their sources and the descriptive statistics.
5 Estimations and Basic Results
Table 2 shows our basic results. We show the technique used to estimate in the 
first line of each column. The six first columns are procedures for finding better 
estimates, considering the federalism model that exists in Brazil and the result of 
the log-likelihood statistics.  
Considering that there is the possibility of pre-established conditions to someone 
being a candidate, the last column shows the selection estimate (following the 
equation [2]) and the Probit-Heckman-vII column shows the Probit result with 
selection bias corrected. The first line of these two columns also shows the general 
estimated probability. The values in brackets are the t statistic for the significance 
test. all of the estimates are based on robust tests (standard deviation with Huber/
White/sandwich heteroscedasticity correction). Given the large number of varia-
bles, we use a darker background to emphasize variables that are significant at least 
at the 10% confidence level.
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Table 2 – Probability of mayor’s reelection (2000)
Independent 
Variables
Probit-I Probit-II Probit-III Probit-IV Probit-V Probit-VI Probit-
Heckman-
VII
(P=0.67)
Candidate-
Selection-
VIII
(P=0.74)
Current Fiscal 
Result (%change)
0.0006 0.0006
(1.03) (0.91)
Tax Revenue  
(%change)
0.003 0.003 0.005 0.002*** 0.002 0.002
(1.58) (1.55) (0.77) (1.60) (0.80) (1.27)
Current Expenditure 
(%change)
0.41* 0.39* 0.41* 0.19*** 0.34*
(6.07) (4.61) (6.07) (1.91) (5.57)
Current Transfers 
(% change)
0.03 0.26*
(0.47) (4.34)
Debt(difference 
in % of Total 
Revenue)
-0.122**  -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04   -0.15** 0.09***  
(-2.19) (-1.21) (-0.66) (-0.63) (-0.70) (-0.79) (-2.40) (1.95)
Debt98(% of Total 
Revenue)
-0.200* -0.08*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04   -0.14* 0.08**
(-4.40) (-1.77) (-0.81) (-0.83) (-1.54) (-0.97) (-2.86) (2.26)
Bailout 0.05   0.08 -0.05
(1.03) (1.56) (-1.02)
Votes96 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006*   0.01* -0.002**
(5.93) (5.91) (5.92) (5.99) (5.91) (6.94) (-2.74)
Literacy (adults) -0.34** -0.21 -0.21 -0.29*** -0.23   -0.01 -0.27**
(-2.07) (-1.28) (-1.28) (-1.71) (-1.35) (-0.08) (-1.75)
New Municipality 0.23* 0.18*   0.18* 0.22* 0.18*   0.07*** 0.14*
(6.15) (4.68) (4.69) (5.69) (4.65) (1.63) (5.32)
Area (km2) 3.27e-06 4.18e-07   4.40e-07 2.31e-06 1.16e-07   2.93e-07 -1.19e-6
(0.62) (0.08) (0.08) (0.44) (0.02) (0.05) (-0.27)
Population00 1.57e-08 6.76e-09 5.81e-09 4.89e-09 1.18e-09   5.05e-07** -3.04e-08
(0.28) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.02) (2.21) (-0.71)
Population 
Growth0091
0.99*** 0.28 0.24 0.43 0.29 -0.02 0.83***
(1.71) (0.45) (0.39) (0.72) (0.46) (-0.03) (1.61)
% of State 
Population
-0.15 -0.06 -0.08 -0.19   -0.07  -0.54 -0.08
(-0.27) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.35) (-0.13) (-0.91) (-0.18)
Urban Population 
(%)
0.07 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.07 0.08   -0.11*** 0.20*
(1.41) (1.63) (1.61) (1.40) (1.56) (-1.83) (4.26)
Metropolitan Region 0.07**  0.07** 0.08** 0.06*** 0.07**   0.05 0.01
(2.05) (2.00) (1.98) (1.89) (1.96) (1.33) (0.47)
(continue)
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Independent 
Variables
Probit-I Probit-II Probit-III Probit-IV Probit-V Probit-VI Probit-
Heckman-
VII
(P=0.67)
Candidate-
Selection-
VIII
(P=0.74)
State Capital 0.15 0.187   0.19 0.22   0.18   -0.09 -0.006
(0.74) (0.89) (0.92) (1.10) (0.90) (-0.29) (-0.04)
North 0.01 0.02   0.19 -0.01   0.02   0.01 0.003
(0.24) (0.37) (0.35) (-0.16) (0.40) (0.31) (0.07)
Northeast 0.15* 0.14*   0.14* 0.13* 0.14* 0.14* 0.009
(3.80) (3.56) (3.50) (3.33) (3.54) (3.28) (0.24)
Midwest -0.08** -0.08**  0.03 -0.07**   -0.08**  0.05 -0.18*
(-2.08) (-2.19) 0.03) (-2.02) (-2.16) (1.14) (-4.74)
South 0.02 0.04    0.04 0.03   0.04***   0.07** -0.01
(0.94) (1.58) (1.58) (1.29) (1.64) (2.49) (-0.55)
Elderly -0.37*
(-6.31)
Observations 2732 2732 2732 2732 2732 2732 2732
Censored Observa-
tion
740
Uncensored Obser-
vations
1992
Log-likelihood -1850.6        -1759.11 -1737.79   -1737.68   -1749.04 -1737.06  -2720.06
Rho -0.49
Prob. Indep of 
Equations
0.24
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Observed P 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426 0.426
Predicted P 0.426 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424 0.424
notes: *** 10%, **5%, *1%. For each independent variable we report (dF/dx), i.e., the marginal chan-
ge in the probability of success for the average values of the other independent variables. In 
parentheses, we report the t-statistics based on robust, heteroscedastic-consistent standard 
errors (Huber/White/sandwich). 
In the Probit-I column we included three fiscal variables: the change in current sur-
plus [Current Fiscal result (%change)], the change in the debt/revenue ratio over 
the term [Debt (difference in % of Total revenue)], and the debt/revenue ratio at 
the beginning of the term [Debt98 (% of Total revenue)]. The first results seem con-
tradictory: while the impact of the current surplus is non-significant, the increase 
in indebtedness over the term and high debt at the beginning of the term seem to 
work against reelection (which could be interpreted as a sign of voters’ fiscal con-
(continuation)
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servativeness). Taking some alternative fiscal variables, we can see that if we use the 
Current Fiscal result (difference) in place of the Current Fiscal result (%change) 
there is no change in the qualitative results (non-reported results). However, when 
we use Debt (% change) in place of Debt (difference in % of Total revenue), the 
coefficient for the variation in the debt/revenue ratio changes its sign: now it gives 
a positive sign, with 7% significance (non-reported result). 
The inclusion of control variables in the Probit-II column changes the picture and 
generates results that are robust to changes in variable definitions. The marked 
reduction in the log-likelihood statistic and the increase of pseudo - r2, presented 
at the bottom of the table, show that including the control variables increased the 
estimation accuracy. The coefficients of the interest variables were altered: the 
change in debt over the term [Debt (difference in % of Total revenue)] is no longer 
significant. The debt at the beginning of the term [Debt98 (% of Total revenue)] is 
significant at the 10% level only and the absolute value of the coefficient has decre-
ased a lot, while current surplus has remained non-significant. Moreover, the qua-
litative results are robust to changes in variable definitions: Current Fiscal result 
(difference) in place of Current Fiscal result (% change) and Debt (% change) in 
place of Debt (difference in % of Total revenue). 9
The Probit-III column in Table 2 analyzes fiscal results, splitting the change in fiscal 
surplus into changes in tax revenue [Tax revenue (%change)] and changes in cur-
rent expenditure [Current expenditure (%change)]. Both variables are defined to 
represent change during the term, with a definition similar to Current Fiscal result 
(%change). Increased current expenditure has a strong positive effect on the pro-
bability of reelection.  Graph 1 illustrates this effect: taking the other variables at 
their means and considering an “old municipality”, if Current expenditure (%chan-
ge) is 10%, the probability of reelection is about 34%; if Current expenditure 
(%change) increases to 40%, reelection probability jumps to 45%.
9 The result is also robust to other changes in variables. For instance, the replacement of the va-
riable Current Fiscal Result for Total Fiscal Result (Total fiscal result = current + capital): the 
“difference” or “% change” form.  see appendix I for variable definitions.
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Graph 1 – Probability of Mayor’s Reelection as a Function o Current Expenditure 
Variation (2000) 
In contrast, tax revenue, debt at the beginning of the term and its change over the 
term are not significant. Once more, qualitative results are robust to changes in 
variable definitions. 10 
let us then explore the data somewhat more in order to analyze the possible cau-
ses of Brazilian voters’ preference for fiscal profligacy on the part of their mayors. 
To check the impact of current transfers on reelection, the Probit-Iv column in 
Table 2 includes the change in these transfers [Current Transfers (%change)] as an 
independent variable. 
It is important to point out that fiscal transfers from the Federal Government and 
from state governments are a central part of the Brazilian federal model. They re-
present the major source of funds for the vast majority of municipalities. according 
to the Government Finance statistics Yearbook, IMF, 2003, own tax revenues 
represent on average only 24% of the total revenue for Brazilian municipalities, 
the other 76% being represented by transfers. Only in the United Kingdom (with 
a unitary government system and local governments with little autonomy and few 
attributions) do current transfers amount to such a high share of local government 
revenues. Municipalities in latin american neighbors such as Mexico, Chile and 
10 The replacement of variables Current Expenditure (% change), Tax Revenue (%change) and 
Debt (difference in % of Total Revenue) for alternative specifications; Total Expenditure 
(%change), Total Expenditure(mean 98-00/97), Total Expenditure(mean of  yearly change), Current 
Expenditure(mean 98-00/97), Current Expenditure(mean of yearly change),Tax Revenue (mean 98-00/97), Debt(% 
change) do not change the qualitative results. see appendix I for variable definitions.
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Colombia are far less dependent on transfers.  Federations with large territories 
and broad social or economic diversity, like Brazil (russia, Canada, australia and 
the Usa) also have less transfer-dependent local governments. analyzing the case 
of Israel, Brender (op. cit.) argues that 60% of its local government revenues are 
generated in the municipality itself, while in Brazil local tax revenues represent 
no more than 20% of the total. This large and atypical volume of transfers that 
Brazilian municipal governments receive led shah (1994, p. 42) to state “municipal 
governments in Brazil (...) should be the envy of all governments in developing, as 
well industrial countries”. 
Despite this huge importance in municipal revenue, when we include the variable 
[Current Transfers (%change)] in the model (Table 2, column Probit Iv) the coe-
fficient is not statistically significant. But change in transfers is strongly correlated 
with change in spending [Current expenditure (%change)].11 When we estimate 
the model by retaining transfers and removing current expenditure (Table 2, co-
lumn Probit-v), current transfers have an important impact on the probability of 
reelection.
How should we interpret the results presented above? Which kind of incentive 
induces mayors to expand expenditure and makes voters reward such behavior? 
rodden (2002) presents a model that provides a good explanation for the mechanis-
ms that lead to the “soft budget constraint” on Brazilian municipalities. according 
to this author, in a federation, sub-national governments tend to behave as “free-
riders” on the benefits created by fiscal stability. Central government, which is 
politically responsible for macroeconomic equilibrium, has incentives to create 
mechanisms to impose financial discipline on states and municipalities. But it may 
not have the political power or instruments to do so. We must, therefore, check 
for factors that determine central government’s ability to subject other government 
levels to financial discipline.
First, there is the issue of the influence of local powers over national decisions. 
Because federal congress members are elected on a local basis they tend to uphold 
the interests of their electoral districts in the federal parliament, bargaining for 
additional financial support. This clearly weakens central government’s commit-
ment not to offer bailouts. 
11 There is high correlation between variables (0,67). It is also important to point out that although 
the main transfers to municipalities are not earmarked for any type of expenditure by local go-
vernments, some health and education-related earmarked funds induce this positive correlation. 
about 15% of the two main items of transfers to municipalities, FPM and ICMs, which will be 
discussed below, are set aside for education. In the health area, some transfers are required to 
be used in the Unified Health system.
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In Brazil, this influence is highly significant, given that the electoral system induces 
the establishment of geographically-limited voter bases, turning a large propor-
tion of representatives into advocates of municipal and state interests before the 
national Congress (MaInWarInG, op. cit., saMUels, 2003).
secondly, heterogeneity between the various municipalities can also weaken the 
non-bailout commitment. In the presence of very large municipalities, the bankrup-
tcy of which can create negative externalities for the remainder of the country (“too 
big to fail”), there will be an incentive for financial rescue. On the other hand, 
there are also municipalities that are “too small to fail”, in other words, those that 
support bailouts for large municipalities in exchange for equal treatment and that 
also require financial assistance or additional transfers. since the fiscal cost of this 
help to small municipalities is inexpressive vis-à-vis the overall taxpayer population, 
there is an opportunity for bargaining and cooperative action between the “too big 
to fail” and the “too small to fail”. Furthermore, because federal constitutions tend 
to deviate from the one man one vote principle, small local governments tend to be 
over-represented, which increases the bargaining power of small municipalities.
Once again, Brazil fits this description perfectly: the least populated states and mu-
nicipalities are over-represented in Congress and great size disparity exists between 
municipalities. While the smallest (Borá, in the state of são Paulo) has less than 
one thousand inhabitants, the largest, são Paulo, also in the state of são Paulo, is a 
megalopolis of over ten million. 
according to IBGe data, 50% of all Brazilian municipalities in the year 2000 had 
fewer than 10 thousand inhabitants. These nearly three thousand municipalities 
greatly benefit from the federal and state transfer sharing system. even taking into 
account the economies of scale of larger municipalities, the transfer system is cle-
arly biased in favor of small-population municipalities. The criteria that create this 
transfer bias are set out in the Federal Constitution. The privilege continues not 
only because small municipalities are over-represented in Congress, but also be-
cause the bias serves as compensation for the frequent federal bailouts that mainly 
serve the larger and more populated municipalities. This, then, is the cooperative 
interplay between the “too small to fail” and the “too big to fail”: small ones benefit 
from the transfer system and large ones from debt bailouts. In the course of the 
1980s and 1990s, several state and municipal debt bailouts took place. To give an 
idea of their size, in april 2007 the Union’s credit against states and municipalities 
from debt refinancing stood at 15% of GDP, of which 13% came from states and 2% 
from municipalities.12 The latest round of bailouts began in 1997, when the Union 
12  Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional [Treasury Department].
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absorbed state debts. In 1999 a similar program was passed for municipalities.13 
One hundred and eighty municipalities benefited from this. The beneficiary mu-
nicipalities are, in fact, the most populated. Municipalities of up to 20 thousand 
inhabitants are under-represented; the reverse applies to the more populous ones. 
For example, municipalities between 50 and 100 thousand inhabitants represent 6% 
of all municipalities in Brazil, and 19% of the total number of bailout beneficiaries. 
It is worth pointing out that refinancing the debt of the Municipality of são Paulo, 
the country’s largest (a typical case of “too big to fail”), accounted for 70% of the 
total funds used by the Federal Government in support of municipalities.14
also according to rodden (op. cit.), another important factor in central government’s 
ability to successfully enforce hard budget constraint on sub-national governments 
is the presence of (effective) legal constraints against state and municipality inde-
btedness. With limited access to the credit market, the power that municipalities 
have to run deficits is limited, thus nipping in the bud mayors’ intentions to incur 
debt and thereby reducing their ability to press central government for financial 
aid. 
The Brazilian Constitution lays down that it is the senate’s duty to impose limits on 
sub-national indebtedness. But the very significant presence of state and municipal 
interests in the senate leads to repeated instances of flexibilization and exception, 
which make indebtedness limits non-binding.15 an index of sub-national borrowing 
autonomy, computed by stein (1999), ranks Brazil as the country with the second 
greatest autonomy for sub-national indebtedness in latin-america, second only to 
argentina. This opens the door to an indebtedness today that will become a bailout 
in the future. 
We must also determine, as Brender (op. cit.) proposes, how voters react to the 
behavior of a mayor who leads the local treasury into bankruptcy to force a federal 
or state rescue package. This probably depends on the cost to voters. If the mere 
threat of financial hardship is enough to allow municipalities to get financial su-
pport from the Union or states (that is, if resistance to additional or emergency 
fund injections is low), municipal services will not stop due to a lack of materials 
or because of personnel strikes. voters who are not affected by a mayor’s fiscal 
recklessness will tend to support, or at least not mind, expansionist management.
13 These programs attempted to couple the bailout with the states’ and municipalities’ commitment 
to fiscal adjustment that, if not complied with, would lead to credible financial sanctions. The 
program has been able to induce an effective fiscal adjustment among state governments, but 
from its inception it has been subject to attack from sub-national governments exerting pressure 
for looser adjustment targets. It is unclear if these stricter budget constraints will prevail in the 
coming years.
14 Secretaria do Tesouro Nacional.
15 Mendes (1999) analyzes this point.
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This seems to be the case in Brazil: there are no recorded cases of services being 
suspended due to insolvency. In general, state governments intervene by providing 
aid in the areas affected by lack of funds. at the federal level, although no bargai-
ning with small or mid-sized municipalities exists to cover deficits or renegotiate 
debts automatically, all that is needed is for a “too big to fail” municipality (or a 
group of smaller ones with significant joint political weight) to fall on hard times 
for negotiations with central government to begin. In times of financial stress and 
political pressure, federal aid has always come fast, through emergency loans exten-
ded by the Federal Treasury, federal banks and even by the Central Bank, followed 
by renegotiation and absorption of all the debt by the Federal Treasury. 
as a result, voters tend not to make a direct connection between fiscal recklessness 
on the part of a mayor and suspended or deteriorated municipal services.16 
To better illustrate this point, Table 2 includes an estimation shown in the Probit-
vI column that contains a dummy for municipalities that benefited from the 1999 
bailout (Bailout). The coefficient is not significant. It shows that voters do not 
punish mayors who resort to federal help. since this help did not impose any costs 
on the municipality and did not lead to a reduction in public services, voters are 
not annoyed by the fact that their mayor went to the country’s capital to beg for 
money. although the marginal difference on log-likelihood is little among the other 
estimates, this result is our choice.  
let us now analyze the control variables. as a means of controlling for popularity, 
personal characteristics or “political capital”, the percentage of votes the mayor 
obtained in his or her former election (Votes96) has a strong impact on their pro-
bability of reelection.17  
The coefficient of the variable New Municipality indicates that voters tend to su-
pport emancipation movements that generate fiscal benefits, as this increases the 
local availability of funds at the expense of the remainder of the federation.18 In 
general, the first mayor of a new city is one of the leaders of the previous emanci-
pationist movement. The coefficient of the dummy for new municipalities (New 
16 It must also be kept in mind that the main public health and education programs are run jointly 
and cooperatively at the three government levels. as a result, voters (particularly those who 
are educationally low achievers) are unable to clearly determine whether responsibility for the 
collapse in services lies with the President of the republic, the state Governor or the Municipal 
Mayor.
17 When Votes96  changes  from 40% to 60%, the reelection probability increases more than 10 
percentage points.
18 Tomio (2005) shows, for example, that in the state of rio Grande do sul, in 263 referendums 
on the emancipation of municipalities, voters opposed secession in only 8 cases and supported it 
in 255.
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Municipality) is significant and indicates an increase of 18 percentage points in the 
probability of the mayor’s reelection (the strongest correlation). another dummy 
variable shows that the probability of reelection in metropolitan municipalities 
(Metropolitan Region00) is 7 percentage points above the mean. With regard to re-
gional dummies, we can see that there are more chances of mayors being reelected 
in the northeast (Northeast region) and south region (South region) than in the 
southeast region (14% and 4% respectively). 
exploring the possibility of a selection bias, we estimated the equation reported in 
the last two columns of Table 2. We hypothesized that age would be an important 
variable in the mayor’s decision about candidacy for reelection. as they get older all 
workers think about retirement. In fact, the selection equation (last column) shows 
that mayors over 70 years old have a candidacy probability that is 37 percentage 
points lower than the mean probability (which is 73%). But the main information 
in this last estimation is that the reelection equation is independent of the candi-
dacy equation (the hypothesis of ρ≠0 is rejected). Therefore our simple Probit-VI 
estimations are consistent.
Turning our attention to the main variables (the fiscal variables), we can see that 
total revenue [Tax revenue (%change)] increases the chance of a mayor being 
reelected by 0.02% (almost zero and with significance only at the 10% level). In 
contrast, an increase in expenditure over the term in office [Current Expenditure 
(%change)] significantly increases the probability of the mayor’s reelection (41%). 
Therefore, the fiscal impact is very important for voters. Considering this result, 
it is possible to reject the hypothesis found in literature: 
HYPOTHesIs 1 - voters are fiscal conservatives: expanded deficit, debt or muni-
cipal spending has a negative effect on the chances of reelection.
The results show that voters like municipal spending. The influence of the fiscal 
federalism model appears to be a determinant of this difference in the case of 
Brazil, considering that the vast majority of municipalities live from transfers. as 
was mentioned by Brender (op. cit.) and akhmedov and zhurasvskaya (op. cit.), the 
influence of institutions affects the preference of voters.
6 Dependence on Schooling
The notion that voters might be fiscal conservatives is firmly rooted in the concepts 
of voter rationality and information. rational, well-informed voters will not admit 
that an incumbent should overspend, because they realize that this will eventu-
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ally lead to financial crisis or increased taxation. However, rational voters (aware 
of their preferences and voting accordingly) may lack sufficient information to 
decide on how to vote. This is the basis of the arguments made by rogoff (1990) 
and rogoff and sibert (1988), in whose models voters — unable to observe the 
incumbent’s effective competence — look for signs that are indicative of competen-
ce. lack of information for voters can also allow incumbents to prioritize maximi-
zing their own utility function (rather than that of the median voter), by increasing 
public spending, either to divert funds (sTrUMPF, 1988), or gain political power 
(nIsKanen, 1971). When transfers represent the lion’s share of municipal reve-
nues, as is the case of Brazil, the information on public finance that is available to 
voters is reduced, as is discussed in literature on the flypaper effect:19 voters are 
better equipped to estimate local tax revenues (being familiar with their city’s 
economic profile and tax revenue potential) than to estimate transfers received, 
which depend on exogenous factors that are not easily observed. Furthermore, the 
educational level of voters is crucial to their cognitive ability to process the infor-
mation available.
It is therefore useful to test the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHesIs 2: the fiscal effects on the probability of reelection depend on the 
voters’ educational level.
We adopted the same technical procedures used before; they are shown in Table 3. 
19    Mieszkowski and Oakland (1979).
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Table 3 – Probability of Mayor Being Re-Elected With Different Sample (Years of 
Schooling)
Independent 
Variables
Probit-High
Literacy
(P=0.65)
Probit-Heckman-
High
Literacy
(P=0.55)
Probit-Low 
Literacy
(P=0.60)
Probit-Heckman-
Low
Literacy
(P=0.71)
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Current Fiscal Result (%change)
Tax Revenue  (%change)
-0.00008 0.001 0.002 0.001
(-0.02) (0.26) (1.27) (1.01)
Current Expenditure (%change)
0.18 0.28** 0.51* 0.26**
(1.60) (2.07) (3.55) (2.27)
Current Transfers (% change)
Debt(difference in % of Total 
Revenue)
-0.26* -0.22 -0.08 -0.12
(-2.13) (-1.59) (-0.63) (-1.24)
Debt98(% of Total Revenue)
-0.23* -0.18 -0.07 -0.11
(-2.03) (-1.40) (-0.63) (-1.55)
Control Variables YES YES YES YES
Observations 584 819 604 819
Censored Observation 235 215
Uncensored Observations 584 604
Log-likelihood -344.75 -362.16
Rho 0.54 -0.92
Prob. Indep of Equations 0.23 0.04
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.11
Observed P 0.64 0.58
Predicted P 0.65 0.60
notes: *** 10%, **5%, *1%. For each independent variable we report (dF/dx), i.e., the marginal 
change in the probability of success for the average values of the independent variables. In 
parentheses, we report the t-statistics based on robust, heteroscedastic-consistent standard 
errors (Huber/White/sandwich). 
We do not show the results of the control variables, but we consider the same va-
riables used in column vI in Table 2. The references to a high literacy rate in the 
first line include municipalities from the sample with a high percentage of adult 
literacy (over 70%). In contrast, a low literacy rate includes municipalities from the 
sample that have a reduced percentage of adult literacy (below 30%). 
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It is important to observe that there is no selection process for the “high literacy” 
group. Therefore, for this group we consider the results in column (I) of Table 3: 
simple Probit model. For the “low literacy” group the Heckman selection model 
indicates dependency between the candidacy and the reelection model. For this 
reason we consider the coefficients shown in column (Iv). 
With regard to the probability of a mayor being reelected, the first line of the Table 
shows that there is a difference between municipalities with high and low literacy 
rates (0.65 and 0.71): illiterate voters tend to reelect their mayors more frequently. 
In “high literacy” municipalities the increase in expenditure in the term Current 
Expenditure (%change) is not significant, but it is significant and much more im-
portant to municipalities that have a low literacy rate. 
Furthermore, we can see that the “high literacy” electorate behaves in a typical, 
fiscally-conservative manner, since it punishes mayors who increase debt during 
their term in office. The “low literacy” group does not present a significant coeffi-
cient for debt variables.
Therefore, we can hypothesize that education level is an important determinant 
of voter behavior.
Peltzman (op. cit.) writes that american ballot results indicate fiscal conservativism 
because voters are wealthier and better informed than non-voters. Because the we-
althier pay more taxes, there is a trend to vote for less spending and less taxes. He 
further argues that voters punish incumbents that increase social spending precisely 
because they favor non-voters. 
The Brazilian case seems to be the opposite: voting is mandatory for the literate 
(including those whose literacy is limited to signing their names) and elective for 
the illiterate. This means that, unlike in the United states, a mass of poorly edu-
cated voters is required to cast their ballot. These voters pay no direct taxes, have 
little information about the indirect taxes they do pay, and have a great demand 
for welfare and public investment in their communities. This sets the stage for 
strong voter support for fiscal expansionism in municipalities. This being the case, 
hypothesis 2 is valid.  
7   Other Relevant Results
We examined the possibility raised by Drazen and eslava (op. cit.) that a successful 
election strategy might change spending composition immediately before a vote, 
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by increasing public investment and reducing current expenditure. no variable in-
dicating the share of investments in expenses20 provided a significant coefficient, 
which indicates that this pattern, which is found in Colombian municipalities, does 
not occur in Brazil.
We decomposed the change in current expenditure and total expenditure by year 
to check whether increased spending in the beginning, middle or end of the term 
had a different impact on the probability of reelection. We found that increased 
spending is positively and significantly correlated with the probability of reelection 
for every year of the term. 
This seems to indicate that the phenomenon detected here is not that of classical 
“political budget cycles,” but a preference for increased spending throughout the 
term. This reinforces the article’s interpretation of the data; that the result springs 
from the fiscal federalism model and from a correlation of forces among federation 
entities that results in a soft budget constraint for all municipalities.
8   Conclusions
This article shows that Brazilian voters have a preference for mayors who increase 
public spending. These results reinforce the idea that there is no such thing as 
“uniform electoral behavior throughout the world”: electoral choices depend on 
the incentives offered to voters. That is why different papers, considering different 
countries, find conflicting results: some point to a “fiscally conservative” profile of 
the electorate and others point in the direction of “fiscal profligacy”.
In the Brazilian case we interpret this statistical evidence as a result of a fiscal 
federalism model, with a soft budget constraint on municipalities. In line with 
rodden (op. cit.), we argue that the weakness of the budget constraint is a result 
of the combination of the great political weight of local interests in the national 
Congress; of the heterogeneity of municipalities, which enables a coalition of inte-
rests between large and small municipalities that organize to extract federal funds; 
excessive fiscal transfers; the municipalities’ ability to manipulate transfer rules; 
and central government’s inability to withstand pressures for bailouts and enforce 
binding legal constraints on sub-national indebtedness. Moreover, there is evidence 
that the population’s low educational level has a greater impact on expenditure 
when compared to the average of municipalities and that a highly literate electora-
20 appendix a contains the definition of public investment variable. The descriptive statistics of 
variables included in this section can be requested from the authors. 
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te behaves in a typical, fiscally-conservative manner, since it punishes mayors who 
increase debt during their term in office.
We must bear in mind, however, that since 2000, the year of the elections analyzed 
here, some institutional advances have occurred. approval of a fiscal responsibility 
act in that same year defined management parameters and created constraints and 
transparency requirements for municipal accounts. above all, there is a commit-
ment not to offer new bailouts and to apply stricter criteria to the approval of sub-
national indebtedness. a federal audit program on randomly selected municipalities 
has exposed cases of corrupt mayors and increased voter information levels. Ferraz 
and Finan (2005) show evidence of a reduced probability of reelection when the 
corruption these audits reveal increases. a federal decision has suspended the es-
tablishment of new municipalities until a federal law is passed that regulates the 
process; this reduces the municipalities’ ability for manipulating federal transfer 
rules.
On the other hand, the municipalities’ great ability to exert power at the federal 
level persists. evaluation of the 2004 and 2008 municipal elections will allow us 
to determine whether the institutional changes have been strong enough and long-
lasting enough to buttress the budget constraint on mayors and promote significant 
changes in municipal voters’ preference patterns.
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ANNEX A – Fiscal Variables
Descriptive Statistics, Variables’ Definition, Sources
Variable Description Source Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
% of State 
Population
Total population of the 
municipality in 2000 divided 
by the total population of 
the state in 2000
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 0.004 0.02 0.00003 0.62
Area (Km2)
Geographic area of the 
municipality (km2)
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 970.61 2198.22 2.85 41191.35
Bailout
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality was bailed out 
by Federal Government 
and zero otherwise. 
Program of municipal debt 
reschedule of 2001 
National Treasury 
Secretariat (STN)
2732 0.03 0.19 0 1
Midwest
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality is located in 
the Midwest region and 
zero otherwise
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 0.08 0.28 0 1
Current 
Expenditure 
(%change)
See definition below National Treasury 
Secretariat  (STN)
2732 0.28 0.17 -0.23 1.87
Current Fiscal 
Result (%change)
See definition below National Treasury 
Secretariat (STN)
2732 -0.05 16.33 -338.81 309.65
Current Transfers 
(%change)
See definition below National Treasury 
Secretariat (STN)
2732 0.30 0.17 -0.32 1.62
Debt (difference 
in % of Total 
Revenue)
See definition below National Treasury 
Secretariat (STN)
2732 -0.04 0.22 -7.33 1.54
Debt98(% of 
Total Revenue)
See definition below National Treasury 
Secretariat (STN)
2732 0.31 0.28 0 7.56
Elderly
Dummy = 1 if mayor is 
over 70 years old and zero 
otherwise
Brazilian Electoral 
Court (TSE)
2732 0.02 0.16 0 1
Human 
Development 
Index 00
Index of life quality based 
on indicators of education, 
health, income and housing 
for the year 2000
United Nations 
Development 
Program
2732 0.72 0.07 0.46 0.91
Literacy (adults)
Percentage of adult 
population who declare 
being able to read and write
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) 
2732 0.81 0.11 0.39 0.99
Metropolitan 
Region
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality belongs to a 
metropolitan region and 
zero otherwise
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) 
2732 0.09 0.29 0 1
North
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality is located in 
the North region and zero 
otherwise
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 .184165 0 1
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Variable Description Source Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
% of State 
Population
Total population of the 
municipality in 2000 divided 
by the total population of 
the state in 2000
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 0.004 0.02 0.00003 0.62
Northeast
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality is located in 
the Northeast region and 
zero otherwise
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 0.20 0.40 0 1
New Municipality
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality was created 
between 1993 and 1996, 
having its first election 
in 1996 and the second 
election in 2000 and zero 
otherwise
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) 
2732 0.08 0.27 0 1
Population 
Growth0091
Population growth rate 
between 1991 and 2000
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) 
- 1991 and 2000 
Census
2732 0.009 0.02 -0.06 0.21
Population00
Total population of the 
municipality in 2000
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 873 1.04e+07
Reelection
Dummy = 1 if mayor 
was reelected and zero 
otherwise
Brazilian Electoral 
Court (TSE)
2732 0.42 0.49 0 1
South
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality is located in 
the South region and zero 
otherwise
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 0.30 0.46 0 1
State Capital
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality is a state 
capital and zero otherwise
Common Knowledge 2732 0.004 0.06 0 1
Southeast
Dummy = 1 if the 
municipality is located in  
the Southeast region and 
zero otherwise
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 0.36 0.48 0 1
Tax Revenue 
(%change)
See definition below National Treasury 
Secretariat (STN)
2732 0.39 5.41 -1 268.86
Urban Population 
(%)
Urban municipal population 
divided by total municipal 
population 
Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) - 
2000 Census
2732 0.59 0.23 0 1
Votes96
Percentage of votes 
obtained by mayors who 
were candidates in 1996
Brazilian Electoral 
Court (TSE)
2732 52.15 9.88 22.92 90.60
Votes00
Percentage of votes  
obtained by mayors in 2000
Brazilian Electoral 
Court (TSE)
1992 49.92 16.22 3 100
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Complementary variables’ definitions
1) total Fiscal Result (%change)
 
( )
( )
2000 1999
1998 1997
1
TFR TFR
TFR TFR
 +
  −
+  
where TFRt is the Total Fiscal result in year t (t should be 2000,1999,1998, and 
1997). similar definitions apply to the following variables: Current Fiscal Result 
(% change), Tax Revenue (%change), Current Expenditure (% change), Total 
Expenditure (% change), Investment (% change). The variables are measured in 
reais (base=2000).
2)  total Fiscal Result (difference)
  
2000 1999 1998 1997( ) ( )
2 2
TFR TFR TFR TRF + −− 
 
where TFR t is the Total Fiscal result in year t(t should be 2000,1999,1998, 
and 1997). similar definitions apply to the following variables: Current Fiscal 
Result (difference), Tax Revenue (difference) Investment (difference), Current 
Expenditure (difference), Total Expenditure (difference). The variables are mea-
sured in reais (base=2000).
3)   total Expenditure (mean 98-00/97) 
  
2000
1998
1997
3 1
t
t
TE
TE
=
−
∑
where TEt is the Total expenditure in year t. similar definitions apply to the 
following variables: Current Expenditure (mean 98-00/97), Investment (mean 98-00/97), 
Tax Revenue (mean 98-00/97), Current Transfers (mean 98-00/97), Total Transfers (mean 
98-00/97), Current Fiscal Result (mean 98-00/97). The variables are measured in reais 
(base=2000).
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4)  total Expenditure (mean of yearly change) 
 
1999
1
1997
1
3
t
t t
TE
TE
+
=
 
−   
∑
where TEt  is the Total expenditure in year t. similar definitions apply to the follo-
wing variables: Current Expenditure (mean of yearly change), Tax Revenue (mean of yearly change). 
The variables are measured in reais (base=2000).
5)  Debt98 (% of total Revenue) 
 
1998
1998
TD
TR
where TD1998  is the Total Debt in 1998 and TR98 is the Total revenue in 1998. The 
variables are measured in reais (base=2000). since there is no available data for 
debt in 1997, Debt98 is taken as a proxy for municipal debt at the beginning of the 
first term.
6)  Debt (difference in % of total Revenue)  
 
2000 1998
2000 1998
TD TD
TR TR
−
where TDt  is the Total Debt in year t and TRt is the Total revenue in year t. The 
variables are measured in reais (base=2000).
7) Debt (% change) 
 
2000
1998
1TD
TD
−
 
where TD t is the Total Debt in year t. The variables are measured in reais 
(base=2000).
The monetary values of years 1997 to 1999 were inflated to prices of 2000 using 
IPCa the price index (broad consumer price index) calculated by the IBGe. Flow 
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variables, like expenditure and revenue, were inflated using the accumulated index 
from July of year t to June of year 2000. The stock variable “debt”, the nominal 
value of which refers to December of each year, was inflated using the accumulated 
index from January of year t+1 to December of the year 2000.
Correlation matrix
Variables % of State 
Population
Area 
(Km2)
Bailout Candidate Midwest Current Expenditure 
(%change)
% of State Population 1.0000
Area (Km2) 0.1635 1.0000
Bailout 0.0994 0.0547 1.0000
Candidate 0.0054 -0.0093 -0.0079 1.0000
Midwest 0.0211 0.2797 0.0384 -0.0941 1.0000
Current Expenditure 
(%change) -0.0242 0.1032 -0.0703 0.1534 0.0605 1.0000
Current Fiscal Result 
(%change) -0.0064 0.0090 0.0080 0.0170 -0.0016 0.0205
Current Transfers 
(%change) 0.0315 0.0976 -0.0053 0.1503 0.0162 0.6824
Debt (difference in % of 
Total Revenue)  -0.0475 -0.0308 0.0149 0.0334 -0.0479 -0.0009
Debt98(% of Total 
Revenue) 0.0699 0.0216 0.2371 -0.0084 0.0700 -0.2550
Elderly -0.0067 -0.0096 -0.0247 -0.1135 -0.0349 -0.0033
Human Development 
Index00 0.0656 -0.0703 0.1826 -0.0942 0.0710 -0.3419
Literacy (adults) 0.0623 -0.0638 0.1469 -0.0903 0.0576 -0.3319
Metropolitan Region 0.1241 -0.0878 0.1116 0.0251 -0.0013 -0.0399
North 0.2201 0.3720 -0.0389 0.0224 -0.0548 0.0340
Northeast 0.0284 -0.0270 -0.0760 0.0931 -0.1517 0.2931
New Municipality -0.0517 -0.0665 -0.0657 0.0958 -0.0472 0.2658
Population Growth0091 0.1213 0.1569 0.0622 0.0791 0.1228 0.1677
Population00 0.6350 0.0563 0.2501 -0.0048 -0.0251 -0.0434
Reelection 0.0109 -0.0130 -0.0070 0.5259 -0.0281 0.1637
South -0.0493 -0.1400 -0.0351 -0.0840 -0.1742 -0.2476
State Capital 0.6250 0.0293 0.1134 -0.0057 -0.0176 -0.0419
Tax Revenue 
(%change) -0.0051 -0.0124 -0.0068 0.0191 -0.0072 0.0375
Urban Population (%) 0.1658 0.0007 0.2179 0.0606 0.1052 -0.1621
Votes96 -0.0548 -0.0708 -0.0586 -0.0671 0.0110 0.0011
Votes00 -0.0456 -0.0382 -0.0328 - -0.0249 0.1961
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Variables Current 
Fiscal Result 
(%change)
Current 
Transfers 
(%change)
Debt 
(difference 
in % of Total 
Revenue)  
Debt98(% 
of Total 
Revenue) 
Elderly Human 
Development 
Index00
Literacy 
(adults)
Current 
Fiscal Result 
(%change)
1.0000
Current 
Transfers 
(%change)
0.0517 1.0000
Debt (difference 
in % of Total 
Revenue)  
-0.0276 -0.1117 1.0000
Debt98(% of 
Total Revenue) 
0.0030 -0.0615 -0.2774 1.0000
Elderly -0.0700 -0.0050 -0.0250 0.0212 1.0000
Human 
Development 
Index00
-0.0080 -0.2559 -0.0166 0.2075 0.0129 1.0000
Literacy (adults) -0.0073 -0.2487 -0.0176 0.2024 -0.0030 0.9459 1.0000
Metropolitan 
Region
-0.0261 0.0552 -0.0123 0.1237 -0.0149 0.2354 0.2480
North 0.0008 0.0502 -0.0382 -0.0556 -0.0249 -0.1151 -0.0707
Northeast 0.0037 0.2791 -0.0038 -0.1614 -0.0110 -0.7308 -0.7761
New Municipality 0.0065 0.0946 0.0343 -0.2599 -0.0150 -0.1574 -0.1171
Population 
Growth0091
0.0136 0.2421 0.0004 0.0013 -0.0104 0.1636 0.1711
Population00 -0.0118 0.0274 -0.0032 0.1524 0.0035 0.1704 0.1561
Reelection 0.0195 0.0938 -0.0330 -0.1240 -0.0588 -0.1397 -0.1528
Reelection Micro 
Region
-0.0017 0.1043 -0.0118 -0.0619 -0.0251 -0.3308 -0.3625
South -0.0132 -0.2234 -0.0178 0.0683 0.0110 0.4104 0.4258
State Capital 0.0013 -0.0381 0.0131 0.0167 -0.0080 0.0754 0.0633
Southeast 0.0096 -0.0631 0.0604 0.0613 0.0277 0.2612 0.2758
Tax Revenue 
(%change)
-0.0032 0.0175 0.0071 -0.0430 -0.0040 -0.0607 -0.0597
Urban 
Population (%) 
0.0004 -0.0280 0.0007 0.3084 0.0227 0.4882 0.4387
Votes96 -0.0148 -0.0542 -0.0184 -0.0977 -0.0525 -0.0685 -0.0688
Votes00 0.0075 0.1072 -0.0468 -0.1731 -0.0754 -0.2046 -0.2136
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Variables Metropolitan 
Region
North Northeast New 
Municipality 
Population 
Growth0091
Population00 Reelection
Metropolitan 
Region
1.0000
North -0.0571 1.0000
Northeast -0.1148 -0.1083 1.0000
New 
Municipality 
-0.0445 -0.0135 0.0313 1.0000
Population 
Growth0091
0.3253 0.0937 -0.0416 0.0409 1.0000
Population00 0.2830 0.0452 -0.0048 -0.0766 0.1229 1.0000
Reelection -0.0015 -0.0208 0.1729 0.1356 -0.0019 0.0274 1.0000
South 0.1213 -0.1244 -0.3441 0.0384 -0.1413 -0.0466 0.0068
State Capital 0.1377 0.0708 0.0218 -0.0212 0.0280 0.7701 0.0374
Southeast 0.0101 -0.1540 -0.4260 -0.0325 0.0654 0.0431 -0.1334
Tax Revenue 
(%change)
-0.0120 0.0051 0.0639 0.0294 0.0183 -0.0116 0.0279
Urban 
Population (%) 
0.2821 -0.0548 -0.2518 -0.2757 0.3422 0.2743 -0.1345
Votes96 -0.1386 -0.0768 0.0088 0.1164 -0.1202 -0.0833 0.2185
Votes00 -0.0279 -0.0408 0.1862 0.1792 -0.0269 -0.0573 0.6677
Variables South State Capital Southeast Tax Revenue 
(%change)
Urban 
Population (%) 
Votes96
South 1.0000
State Capital -0.0223 1.0000
Southeast -0.4893 -0.0167 1.0000
Tax Revenue (%change) -0.0275 -0.0040 -0.0282 1.0000
Urban Population (%) -0.1274 0.1017 0.3029 -0.0519 1.0000
Votes96 0.1020 0.0114 -0.0781 -0.0006 -0.1738 1.0000
Votes00 -0.0078 -0.0046 -0.1253 0.0306 -0.2018 0.3281
